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GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF
BUSINESS IN A FEDERAL STATE:
ALLOCATION OF POWER
UNDER DEREGULATION
By ELI M. NOAM*

I.

INTRODUCTION
The reduction in federal controls of business activities, generally described
by the term "deregulation", has been the policy of three successive United
States' Administrations.' While the economic impact of this policy has been
closely watched, its effects on the federal structure of government has received
scant attention. Yet in a federal state, deregulation affects the division of
responsibility among different levels of government, and consequently regulation itself, in unanticipated ways. Federal deregulation has led to a great deal
of turmoil at the state level: "It's clear the battlegrounds are shifting from
Washington to the state capitals," says the President of the Minnesota
Association of Commerce & Industry. 2 "The spending interests know they
have no clout in Washington, so they are focusing on state legislatures...
where they think they can be most productive." 3 The Director of Environmental Quality for Dow Chemical U.S.A. reports that: "We perceived after the
election that environmentalists were deactivating themselves in Washington
was a conscious decision that we had to be
and moving to the states. There
'4
more active in state affairs."
Clearly, regulatory policy in the federal sector of government has secondary effects at all levels of a federal state. It is the purpose of this paper to
discuss some of these interactions. In order to do so, the paper investigates
first the regulatory policies that may be expected to flow from alternative
jurisdictional arrangements. It analyzes five different distributions of regulatory power by way of a formal model of regulation and shows that the alloca© Copyright, 1982, Eli M. Noam

Associate Professor Business and Lecturer in Law, Columbia University.
' For example, SecuritiesActsAmendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97

(1975) (amending various sections of 15 U.S.C.); Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, Titles I & II, 90 Stat. 31 (1976)
(amending various sections of 45 U.S.C. & 49 U.S.C.); Airline DeregulationAct of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (amending various sections of 49
U.S.C.); In re Regulation of Domestic Receive-only Satellite Earth Stations, 74 F.C.C.
2d 205 (1979) (deregulation satellite domestic communications); In re Deregulationof

Radio, 73 F.C.C. 2d 457 (1979); Depository InstitutionsDeregulation and Monetary
ControlAct of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (amending various sections of 12 U.S.C.); Motor CarrierActof 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980)

(amending 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV).

2 "The lobbying arena shifts to state capitals", Business Week, Nov. 30, 1981 at 58.
3Id.
4Id.
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tion of regulatory power has an important impact on policy outcomes; suggesting that the choice of regulatory jurisdiction is not merely procedural, but
policy determinative.
If the allocation of regulatory power affects regulatory policy, one would
expect an interest group to support regulation by that level of government
whose policy is more likely to be favourable to its interests. The empirical section of the paper confirms this. Furthermore, the abolition of federal regulation may result in an equilibrium of state regulation of higher strictness than
before, or in a highly non-uniform regulation across the nation. Neither outcome may be preferable to the previous federal policy-even to the proponents
of federal deregulation. Hence, over time, preference for a central solution
may again increase, and the pendulum may swing back to a federal regulation.
Federal regulatory policy is thus an important variable in the allocation of
governmental authority, and its dynamic fluctuations affect the nature of a
federal state.
II. LITERATURE
Although much has been written on intergovernmental relations, there are
surprisingly few studies that deal with regulation in a federal setting, and no
5
body of research exists that is comparable to the models of fiscal federalism.
Concerning related areas, perhaps most useful is the literature of the "theory
of clubs".6 Other authors discuss the rivalry between jurisdictions 7 and interjurisdictional mobility. 8 Recent contributions are Rose-Ackerman's public
choice analysis 9 and Oster's' 0 study of diffusion of legislation.
The legal literature of regulatory federalism is of little help, being primarily focused on constitutional issues. Most useful are discussions of federal preemption,11 of uniform laws,1 2 and of industry studies such as banking and cor5Breton, A Theory
of Government Grants (1965), 31 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci.
175; Breton and Scott, The Economic Constitution of Federal States (Toronto: U. of
Tor. Press, 1978); Oates, FiscalFederalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1972);6 Thurow, The Theory of Grants-in-Aid(1965), 19 Nat'l Tax J. 373.
Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs (1965), 32 Economica 1; McGuire,
Private Good Clubs and Public Good Clubs: Economic Model of Group Foundation
(1972), 74 Swedish J. Econ. 84; Pauly, Coresand Clubs, Pub. Choice 53 (1970).
7
Ostrom, OperationalFederalism: Organizationfor the Provision of Public Service in the American Federal System, Pub. Choice 1 (1972); Peltzman and Tideman,
Local VersusNationalControl: Note (1972), 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 959; Stigler, Economic
Competition andPoliticalCompetition Pub. Choice (1970), 91.
8Mills and deFerranti, Market Choice and Optimum City Size (1968), Amer. Econ.
Rev. 340; Rothenberg, "Local Decentralization and the Theory of Optimal Government" in Margolis, ed., The Analysis of Public Output (New York: Columbia U. Press,
1970) 31; Tibout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures(1956), 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416.
9Rose-Ackerman, DoesFederalismMatter?PoliticalChoice in a FederalRepublic
(unpublished
manuscript, Yale Univ., ISPA, 1981).
10 Oster, An Analysis of InterstateDifferences in ConsumerRegulation (1979), 18
Econ. Inq. 39.
11
Bowder, A Conceptual Refinement of the Doctrine of Federal Preemption
(1973), J. Public L. 391; Freeman, Dynamic Federalismand the Concept of Preemption
(1971), 21 De Paul L. Rev. 630.
1 Schnader, Why the Commercial Code Should Be 'Uniform' (1963), 20 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 237.
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porate charters. 13 There is some discussion by political scientists of the determinants of the regulating level of government.1 4 But an extensive bibliography
of federalism concludes that:
There are weaknesses in the literature on federalism. These include an overabundance of historical summaries and descriptive works, undertaken without relation
to a stated theory.... Yet to be done is a more empirical comparison of centralized
unitary systems and federal systems ....
Too few studies now exist which pair
careful observation with explicitly stated hypotheses derived from theory.' 5
One basic question which has not been satisfactorily answered is why
economic activities are regulated by different levels of government. There are,
broadly speaking, two kinds of conventional explanations for the existence of
a particular jurisdictional arrangement. The first is traditionalist in outlook
and historico-constitutional in methodology. Each level of jurisdiction, it is
said, has a traditional role, specified by constitution or custom. 16 In the United
States, the roles of the federal government are specified in its constitution,
though the interpretation of their extent has expanded over time. Local
governments' regulatory roles, on the other hand, are those vested by the
states, either explicitly through statute or through traditional police powers;
and the states occupy much of the rest. It is characteristic of this historical
view to see the determination of the governmental level of regulation as a
product of political agreements, periodically modified as necessary. One learns
how allocations of power among governments came about, but not necessarily
why they did so. To answer the latter question a second, broader, more
analytical set of explanations exists which may be called "functionalist".17
Functionalists observe that there are economies of scale in the provision of
regulation, just as there are for many services, at least over some range of production. Some regulatory activities, for example zoning, are handled most efficiently on a small scale, close to the object of regulation. Others, such as
airline regulation, are undertaken most efficiently on a large scale, by formulating nationwide rules. The choice of jurisdictional level therefore requires
finding the scale economy of a regulating activity' 8 and vesting authority in the
most efficient size of jurisdiction. A related version of the functional explanation, favoured by many economists, uses externalities as a criterion. 19 The
13 Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflection upon Delaware(1974), 83 Yale
L.J. 663; Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism(1966), 31 Law & Contemp. Prob. 749; Scott, The DualBanking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation (1977),
30 Stan. L. Rev. 1.
14 Elazar, The American Partnership: Intergovernmental Co-operation in the
Nineteenth-Century United States (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1962); Grodzins,
"The Federal System", President's Commission on National Goals for Americans
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1960); Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation,
Significance(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964).
IsBachelder and Shaw, Federalism: A Selected Bibliography (unpublished
manuscript, Inst. for Community Development and Services, Mich. State U., 1964).
16 Corwin, A Constitutionof Powers in a Secular State (Charlottesville, Va: Michie
Pub., 1951).
17 McGuire, supranote 6.
18 Tullock, Federalism:Problems of Scale (1969), 6 Public Choice 19.
'9 Zerbe, OptimalEnvionmentalJurisdictions(1974), 4 Ecology L.Q. 193.
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logical jurisdictional level is said to encompass the area within which
regulatory policies have externalities, that is, where regulation, "internalizes
the externalities". Implicit in the functionalist explanation is the belief that the
regulatory level is determined by "objective" economic criteria; in holding this
view the explanation is an extension of the wider public benefit theory of
regulation.
This paper, in contrast, argues that the determination of the regulatory
level is not primarily a question of historical tradition, functional efficiency,
or externalities, but rather a question of variations in interest group power at
different levels of government. It shows that the determination of the
regulatory level is in itself a decision about the strictness of regulation that will
prevail. Interest groups pragmatically desire the regulatory level whose outcome they like best, and the relation between group strengths and benefits on
the different governmental levels determines the preferred governmental levels
of regulation.
III. THE MODEL 20
Let A be a jurisdiction with two interest groups L and F (which may be
imagined as labour unions and firms) and let there be a type of regulation that
affects only these two groups and that can be set by a regulating agency at
some variable degree of restrictiveness (R). This regulation will affect each
member of group L positively and each member of group F negatively, according to the restrictiveness of the regulation, such that benefits (w) from the
regulation are, for each group member:

WL = a0 + alRa2

(1)

WF = b o - blRb2

(2)

with the first derivatives:

dwL

(3)

dR
dwF

--

<1.(4)

dR
The constants a0 and b0 illustrate the benefits to members of a group when
there is no regulation. The exponents are assumed to be positive such that:2 1

0 <a 2 < 1
1 <b

2

20 Less mathematically inclined readers may skip this section and proceed to section IV.
21These assumptions simplify calculations considerably by eliminating corner
solutions.
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Both interest groups exert pressures on the regulating agency by granting support to or withdrawing support from the regulator according to the stake that
they have, as a group, in achieving or perpetuating a certain regulatory strictness. This stake is the aggregate benefit due to regulation (R), which is the
product of average member benefit (wi) times the number of group members
(Ni). Total benefits from regulation are hence:
W = WLNL + wFNF

=

(-a0 + aR a2) NL + (b 0 - b Rb2) NF.

Regulation is set by the agency according to some optimization criterion. This
criterion is, of course, the subject of some debate. 22 For those who hold the
"public benefit" view of regulation, the agency's objective is to maximize the
benefits to society; for others, such as Niskanen, 23 it is to maximize the
agency's self-interest. These two criteria are not necessarily inconsistent if we
assume that an agency, whether state or federal, sets the restrictiveness of
regulation to maximize its total support (S), and that such support is a
monotonously increasing function of aggregate benefits (W):
S = F(W); where F w > 0.

(8)

The optimizing restrictiveness of regulation, denoted by the asterisked R*, is
then found by maximizing benefits. To do so, we set the first derivative at
zero:
dW--= 0 24
dR
This results in the optimal regulation R* at the strictness:
(9)
R* =

[bl2

a2-b2

Lala2NL_

22 For extensive discussions of the theories of regulation see Edwards, Regulation
under Attack, New and Old Perspectives on the Economics of Regulation, Research
Working Paper No. 161 (New York: Colum. U., Graduate Sch. of Bus., 1977); Posner,
Theories ofEconomicRegulation (1974), 5 Bell J. Econ. Mngt. Sci. 335.
3Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine,
Atherton, 1971).
24 It can be shown that the second order conditions for a maximum in R* are fulfilled, and that regulation R* increases with the influence of group L and decreases with
that of F, as one would expect.
2s If conditions (5) and (6) are relaxed, there will normally be a corner solution,
either R* = 0, (in other words, no regulation,) or R*N = , (i.e., total prohibition of
the activitiy).
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We now introduce a second jurisdiction, B, making identical assumptions
(1) through (8) about the effects of regulation on each member of B's interest
groups LB and F B , and about the decision rule of its regulator. The size of the
two groups-denoted by ML and MF-may be different in B from that in A.
B's regulatory restrictiveness is then analogous to that of state A. We assume
at this point that the regulation of one state does not affect the other state, that
is, there are no spill-over effects. This assumption will be relaxed soon.
Suppose now that the two states agree that the regulation be centrally set
at a common national strictness (RN) and that a central regulating agency be
established. National (that is, federal) regulation, it is assumed, is set by the
central regulator at its support maximizing level, which is determined by the
size of combined groups and influences, aggregated nationally. It is given,
analogously to (9), by the expression:

R*

blb2(N+ M)F

(10)

1
a -2b2

Ma(N+M)L1

R*N =

25
National regulation is less strict than state regulation for state A if R*N < R*.
Comparing (10) with (9) one can see that this is the case when:

(N+M)F> NF
(N+M)L

(11)

NL

that is, when the ratio of group sizes (termed "power ratio") is more favorable
to the pro-regulation group L on the state level than it is on the national level.
This is quite intuitive. Hence, one can expect the anti-regulation group F in
state A to be in favour of regulation on the national level, because on that level
its influence is greater and regulation is lower, while group L will be opposed
In state B, the opbecause of the dilution of its position on the national level.
26
posite position will be taken by the two interest groups.
For a state's predominant interest group to support a national form of
regulation, the power ratio on the national level must amplify that ratio which
exists within the state. National regulation is not sought where states are heavily
dominated by one of the interest groups-and it is immaterial which one it
is-because this predominant group will normally not want its influence
diluted on the national level. The most favourable condition for a state opting
for national regulation occurs where one group has a slight majority that it can
lever into a larger majority by joining a national regulatory scheme.
The model is now expanded so that the regulation in one state affects the
interest groups in the other state as well. For example, environmental regulations in state B will improve A's air quality and hence the well-being of its
26

Noam, The Interaction of FederalRegulation and State Regulation (1980), 1
Hofstra L. Rev. 195.
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group LA. Group F in state A is also benefitted by B's regulation if, for instance, it has competitors in state B which must contend with the added costs
from regulation. This can be described by benefit equations of the form:
WLA =
WFA

-a0 + aIRAa2RBa3

= bo- bl

(12)
(13)

RAb2 RBb3

where a 3 and b 3 are the cross-elasticities. Given the benefit functions, the optimal regulation R for the support minimizing regulator in state A is therefore
found to be:
I

ba3] a2b2

ib
R*A

L

bib 2
aa 2

NF RB
NL

(14)

Thus we have a regulatory strictness in A which is, among others, a function of
state B's regulation:
R*A = mRBt

(15)

where m and t are a short notation for the remaining parameters of (14). The
analogous relations hold for R B, so that R*B = nRAt. Thus we have a Cournottype reaction model in which each state adjusts its regulation in response to the
other state's. This is shown in Appendix 1. Given an initial RAI) RBI is determined by B's reaction, which in turn generates RA2, and so on. This process
leads either to an equilibrium or to corner solutions; the latter occuring where
states drive each other into total deregulation or into total prohibition. An example of such a competitive deregulatory trend is the increasing liberalization
of state corporation statutes in the United States, a process which has been
described by a former Chairman of the American Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) as a "race to the bottom". 27 An example for a "race to the
top", in which each state attempts to shift undesirable activities to its neighbours, or at least tries to avoid becoming the recipient of their undesirable exports, is the regulation of nuclear reactors and of radio-active waste.
The point of intersection of the two reaction functions is at:

1_
RA =

(16)

(mnt).

A stable equilibrium exists when R B = f(RA) is steeper than the inverse of
RA = g(RB) at the point of intersection. It can be shown that this holds when:
a 2 - b2 > b 3 - a 3

27

See Cary, supra note 13.

(17)
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that is, when the difference in the elasticities of benefits with respect to a
state's own regulation exceeds the difference of the cross-elasticities with
respect to the other state's regulation. When this condition is met, the strictness of regulation for A in such an interactive setting is, from (16), after
substitutions:
1

b3a3

1

F
R*A

=

(blb2) a 2-b 2 + b-a3 (NF)
(ala2)
(N)

a2-b 2

(M)

(a2-b2) 2 - (b3-a)

2

(18

(ML)

Suppose, however, that the reactions of both states are such that no
equilibrium is reached, but rather a "race to the bottom" takes place to the
detriment of both states. In this situation several remedies are possible; the
first possibility is federal regulation, the second, agreement among the states
on common regulatory strictness. These arrangements are close relatives of
mergers and price fixing in their private sector. With federal regulation, the expected national regulatory strictness (RN) is found by maximizing the support
function to a federal regulator by the interest groups. This occurs at:
1

[
N

(19)

b,(b2 +b,) (FA+FB) ] (a 2+a3)-(b2+b3)
a (a 2 + a3) (LA+ LB)

Other jurisdictional arrangements are also possible. Thus, states may
agree directly among themselves on regulatory policy, the most frequent procedure being the mutual passing of pre-written acts of legislation known as
uniform laws. Such agreements share the problem of private cartel
agreements, since each state holds some veto power if uniformity is sought.
Just as a convoy travels at the speed of its slowest ship, so too, regulation by
uniform law does not extend beyond the point where each state is at least as
well off as before, assuming that no interstate compensation exists, and that
unanimity is required. This occurs at:
1
(20)
[ b1(b2+b3) FG i(a 2 + a 3) - (b 2 + b3)

L
FG

where F

LG

al(a 2 + a3) LG
FA

is the larger of-A and
LA

FB
-

LB

It is also possible that regulation is not uniform but discriminatory, where
discrimination is defined as the imposition of different measures of strictness
in different jurisdictions by one government. This can occur, for example,
where one state is able to impose some regulation on another, or where the national government does not treat states alike. In the first situation the
regulatory agency of state A can impose regulations not only on its own state,
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but is can also set state B's regulations, with the sole goal of benefitting A.
This arrangement may be called "colonialism". An example is Britain's
regulation of the opium trade in China and of textile spinning in India in the
nineteenth century. Analytically, RA and RB are set to maximize (WL + WF)A
where both RA and RB are variable. 28 The second form of discrimination involves the federal regulator's setting of different degrees of strictness in states,
either by an outright fixing of different regulatory rules, or by setting floors or
ceilings of regulatory restrictiveness in such a way that they effectively constrain only one state. Discriminatory regulation can improve the combined
benefits of the regulated groups; its strictness is given by the solutions to the
equation:
Ra2-b2RAa 3-b 3 = b, (FA+FB) (b 2RB+b 3 RA)
(21)
a,

(a 2RB+ a3 RA)

(LA+ LB)

Let us now take stock: the model has generated analytical results for the
regulatory strictness that can be expected to prevail for a variety of jurisdictional arrangements, including state regulation, federal regulation, uniform
laws, colonialism and discrimination in federal regulation. Only in unusual circumstances will any such strictness be identical to that of another jurisdictional arrangement. Because the regulatory strictness depends in each case on
the size and direction of the parameters, it is impossible to assert that any one
level of government or intergovernmental arrangement is invariably stricter
than another. Appendix 2 is a schematic illustration of a hypothetical regulation. Corresponding to each jurisdictional distribution is a pair of regulatory
strictness (RA) and (RB), each of which is different from the other. Thus, the
question which level of government is endowed with regulatory authority,
seemingly a procedural issue, may in fact be seen to be, in part at least, a
substantive determination of the strictness of the regulation itself.
One would expect that interest groups, if they behave rationally, will seek
that level of government whose regulatory outcome is most favourable to
them, regardless of their official ideology. Historical examples come to mind,
such as the United States railroads' support for a national railroad commission
in the 1880s, after state regulation began to be onerous, or the establishment of
federal occupational safety and health regulations in the response to union
28 We find that the optimal regulation to be set in the ruling state A is then:
R*CA=

( b b-(a2-2)
2 a'2 )((1AA)
3
(
)'(bbFb_-+1
2 2

(b 2 ++
a3 a I

b 3-a 3

LA

bb
a 3 a1

a3

b-3

2(a 2I b

3

and in the dominated state B it is:

1
b 3 -a3 (Bb2+bbl)'b

R*
CB

a3alLA
3 LA

)

a a1 --

2 "a2 FFA"_+3

L)
3 LA

3

+ 1 .(bb3)b3
bb
3

ala 3

a3 I

2(b 3"a
-a3 )
3
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pressure. Both instances were "upward" shifts of regulation from the state to
the federal level at the urging of interest groups otherwise philosophically and
economically in conflict. The unifying principle is that they expected national
regulation to be more advantageous to their interest than state regulation. The
preferences for national regulation over local regulation by a group will depend on the outcomes that it can expect at each level. This theoretical conclusion is tested empirically in Part IV of this paper.
The following section concentrates on the difference between regulation
by the federal government and by the states. For both pro- and anti-regulatory
interest groups the important question is which of the two levels of government supplies a stricter regulation. The underlying assumption of advocates of
federal deregulation is that their policy eliminates or reduces regulation as
such. But this may well be incorrect. As long as federal rules exist, states are
prevented, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, to
enact concurrent regulations that are in conflict with the federal ones. Furthermore, the existence of a national regulatory mechanism focuses the efforts of
interest groups on the activities of the central agency. But if such an agencyor its rules-is abolished, state regulation cannot be expected to remain the
same as before. The problems that federal rules were originally enacted to
remedy usually still exist, and there is no dearth of support for the replacement
of abolished federal laws with state regulation.
One consequence of this development is that multiple state standards are
likely to emerge whose non-uniformity may often be expensive to comply with.
If, for example, each state enacted its own automobile emission rules, as
California did, the results could make car production inefficient and costly.
Even where uniformity is not a problem, the strictness of the state regulation
that may emerge will not necessarily please the advocates of deregulation. The
spill-over effects from changes in other states' regulatory policies may force a
reaction much in the way that the Cournot model in Appendix 1 suggests. This
is easy to see in a "race to the top" situation, where the states drive each other
to higher and higher strictness as they try to shift undesirable activities to their
neighbours. But even within a stable equilibrium situation, the emerging strictness in a given state may be greater than the preceding federal regulation. This
will be the case, generally speaking, if one interest group experiences substantial positive externalities from the regulation in another state, or when all interest groups experience at least some positive spill-overs, or when the antiregulation group is particularly sensitive to changes in its own states' regulation.
It is helpful to refer again to Appendix 1. Contrasted with state regulation, federal rules are stricter when federal regulation is at a point similar to P 3
on the graph, and P1 is the state regulatory equilibrium. On the other hand, if
the federal regulation had been at P 2, state regulation will actually be higher.
Or, where federal regulation is at P 3 and its removal triggers a "race to the
top" in state regulation, a federal ceiling will be lower than the decentralized
outcome. The common assumption of federal deregulation is that of a P 3 type
of situation. However, as we can now appreciate, this is only one of several
possibilities. It may be objected that federal regulation would not have been
abolished in the first place if this had resulted in a stricter state regulation,
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since to do so would be counterproductive. Yet for this objection to be true
one must presuppose a political decision process of considerable foresight.
When the abolition of federal regulation is sought there are only limited concurrent state regulations in existence. Yet once federal regulation is abolished,
the interest group pressures may generate regulation in some states, and
precipitate adjustment to it by others.
It is interesting to speculate what sets this process in motion. One explanation is that a previously existing point of equilibrium that determined federal
regulation has been disturbed by a shift in the relative influence of the interest
groups. It is also possible that no shift in interest group powers has occurred
but that a slow and cyclical process of oscillation between federal and state
regulation exists even in the absence of changes in the power balance. Such
cycles are possible even with quite stable preferences within the body politic
for regulatory strictness. The level of government that will be vested with
regulatory authority is the one whose regulatory strictness most resembles the
preferences of the interest group body-politic. This choice would be different
at varying times because the states' regulation and, hence, attractiveness
changes. For example, state regulation may be, at an initial point P 1, too high
relative to expected national regulation P 21 given the prevailing influence of interest groups L and F. The result is a decision for national regulation, which
eliminates most state regulation by federal pre-emption. At that point national
regulation may become unfavourably high in comparison to the state alternative; hence federal deregulation occurs. But now the states' regulation increases and their regulatory strictness
moves towards equilibrium in P . From
29
there, the cycle can start anew.
One way to deal with unanticipated state responses is to forbid them.
States may thus be "pre-empted" from regulating on their own, and this is indeed the trend that has accompanied the recent United States' experience with
deregulation. This, however, implied an increase in the powers of central
government, the opposite result from the one desired by many proponents of
deregulation.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL: EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
The final section of the paper reports an empirical test for the impact of
interest groups on the choice between two levels of regulation. We have
asserted that the choice of jurisdictional level is a way of obtaining interest
groups' most preferred regulatory outcome. It is difficult to empirically prove
this hypothesis because there is normally no observable choice of jurisdictional
level. The regulatory arrangement simply exists, and one cannot measure a
preference for the alternative. However, there are some instances where a
choice of regulatory levels is observable. In the United States, banks can
choose whether they want to be chartered and supervised federally or by a
state. 30 In other instances, firms can choose to avoid certain regulations of the
United States' federal government by reducing the scope of their activities to
29 This

section is part of Noam, The Choice of GovernmentalLevel in Regulation

(1982), 35 Kyklos 278.
30
Supra,note 5.
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intrastate commerce, thus exempting themselves from federal jurisdiction.
Airlines, for example, can free themselves from Washington's regulations by
flying only within one state, and a number of carriers have done so in California and Texas. In all of these instances, however, we deal primarily with
management choice rather than with a political decision about which level of
government should be in charge of controlling a particular economic activity.
For an empirical analysis of how the political process determines which
governmental level should have regulatory powers, an investigation of
American building codes provides a unique source of data. Building codes are
the technical standards for the construction of residential and commercial
buildings. They deal with the thickness of walls, the materials permissable for
plumbing, the insulation of electrical wiring, etc. In the United States, these
codes are set in two possible ways. The first is to enact a code that is written
locally, and is therefore known as a "local code". The second possibility is to
adopt a "national code" that is set by an outside national body. A national
code association is in effect a single-issue national level; while it does not have
the federal government's powers. But this actually makes for better data since
national standards are not mandated, and their adoption is a revealed choice.
Building code standards are of great importance to the interest groups involved in construction, particularly where codes involve the approval of
labour saving construction methods such as prefabrication. American construction unions have traditionally advocated codes that restrict labour saving
techniques because of their fear that they would reduce the demand for skilled
craftsmen. Builders, on the other hand, prefer unrestrictive codes, because
new building techniques reduce the cost of construction and the importance of
unionized skilled labour. The interest of the general public in building codes is
much more limited due to their low visibility and highly technical nature.
Therefore, the relevant interest groups A and B of the model can be identified
as construction firms and construction unions.
Data for the building codes of over 1100 American cities and towns is
available from a 1970 survey by the International City Manager Association
(ICMA) 31, and is described in Field and Ventre. 32 Additional data on housing,
construction firms, and demographics originated with the U.S. Census Survey
of Housing, 33 the U.S. Department of Labor, 34 and Oster and Quigley. 35
The question for empirical analysis is how the choice for a national versus
a local code can be explained. The "functionalist" hypothesis for the
regulatory level, based as it is on economy of scale considerations, would
31 Data made available by R. Ventre, National Bureau of Standards, and gratefully
acknowledged.
32
Field and Ventre, "Local Regulation of Building Agencies, Codes and Politics"
in Municipal Yearbook (Wash. D.C.: Int'l City Mngt. Assoc., 1971).
33
U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and
Housing (Wash. D.C.: U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1960, 1970).
34
U.S. Dep't. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Industry Wage Survey: Contract Construction(Wash. D.C.: U.S. Gov't. Printing House, Sept. 1972) Bulletin 1853;
U.S. Dep't. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics: 1975
Reference Edition (Wash. D.C.: U.S. Gov't. Printing House, 1975) Bulletin 1865.
35 Data made available by J. Quigley and gratefully acknowledged.
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predict that the size of the jurisdiction or the workload of an agency are explanatory variables. The second hypothesis, which we termed the historicolegal explanation, would predict that political ideology, history, or tradition
are determinative. Finally, the interest group hypothesis that was developed in
this paper predicts the choice to be dependent upon interest group strengths on
the local level relative to the ones on the national level.
The validity of these different hypotheses may be tested by an analysis of
the factors that explain the probability of the adoption of a national code by a
community. They are expressed by the PROBIT function of the form:
NATCODE = b0 + b1POP + b2BUILDPERM + b 3EMP + b 4LAND +

b 5CONSERV + b6REGI + b 7TOWN + b8CODEAGE +
b 9CITYMAN + bl] PN - SUNIONI
SFIRM
I
Where the variables are described by:
36
NATCODE Adoption of a national code in a local community
POP
Population in jurisdiction
BUILPERM Number of building permits issued per year
Number of employees in building department
EMP
Land area of jurisdiction
LAND
37
CONSERV
Conservative voting in jurisdiction
REGI
Geographical regions of country
Town (vs. suburb or city)
TOWN
CODEAGE
Length of existence of code in jurisdiction
CITYMAN
City manager form of government
38
SUNION
Strength of construction unions
SFIRM
PN

39
Strength of construction firms

Ratio of national strength of unions to firms
Note the last variable of the equation above. It shows the difference between the national ratio of interest group strengths PN to the locally existing
ones. According to our hypothesis, the larger the absolute difference, the
smaller should be the preference for national regulation.
A.

Results

The results are given in the Table in Appendix 3. Let us first look at the
factors that would support the functional, that is, efficiency hypothesis of the
determination of the jurisdictional level. For example, one expects that the
larger a town and the greater the activity level of its building department, the
36Unless otherwise noted the data are from the above mentioned ICMA figures,
supra note 31.
37

Defimed as percentage of vote for Goldwater in the Presidential election of 1964.

38 Percent unionization in building crafts times number of construction workers,
normalized for national average. Data from U.S. Dep't. of Labor (1972, 1974), and
provided by J. Quigley (1977).

39Construction volume times concentration ration of building firms, normalized
for national average. Data U.S. Dep't. of Commerce (1972), and provided by J.
Quigley.

1982]

Allocation of Power UnderDeregulation

more likely it is that it will regulate locally if there are economies of scale. One
finds indeed a statistically significant negative relationship between national
regulation and population size, but it is extremely small. Second, using the
number of building permits that are processed by an agency as a measure of its
activity level, one finds a co-efficient that is both small and insignificant.
Third, for the number of employees (as a measure for the size of the department), and for the land area of the community (as a measure of geographical
scale) the co-efficients are small, insignificant, and with counter-intuitive
positive signs. In short, no evidence is found for an economies of scale explanation of jurisdictional choice.
The historico-ideological hypothesis ought to be reflected in the determination of the jurisdictional level by political, regional, or historical
variables. Yet the empirical analysis does not support this theory. First, no effect of political ideology may be found. Whereas the conservative ideology in
the United States normally favours localism, here it is actually associated with
a greaterlikelihood of national standards. Similarly, neither the Southern nor
the Western regions of the United States, despite their historical tradition of
anti-centralism, show a preference for local regulation. In fact, towns and
cities of these areas are more likely to be regulated by a national code than
those of the North and Midwest.
The "political constitution" of a locality seems to make no difference
either. There are two major forms of administration in American municipalities. The first is the mayor-city council system, in which the elected officials
wield administrative powers. The alternative is for the elected bodies to appoint a professional "city-manager" who is in charge of the administrative affairs of local government. One may expect that under the more professional
city-manager system, building codes are less affected by politics. However,
when a variable for a city manager form of government is introduced as a
measure for a separation of building codes from politics, it is found to have
but little explanatory power. On the other hand, it seems to make a difference
how old and established a building code is, judging from the high significance
of the factor CODEAGE. But the magnitude of the co-efficient is very small.
If functional and ideologico-historical factors are found to have only little
effect on the choice of local regulation, the relative strength of interest groups
is a strong explanation. This co-efficient is of fairly good size and statistical
significance (t = 2.2641). With both its size and negative sign it confirms that
where relative extremes exist in the local power relation between the two affected interest groups, the likelihood for national regulation is small since the
locally dominant group will not wish to dilute its influence on the national
level.
These results are even more strongly confirmed when one splits the set of
observations into two groups, those where unions are predominant and those
where firms are predominant. 40 Using the same statistical PROBIT analysis
4 To do so we separate those observations where union strength-normalized

relative to the national average-is higher than that of firms also normalized, from
those where it is lower.
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over these sets, we find that both interest groups reverse their preference,
depending on whether they are predominant or not, as can be seen from the
results in Appendix 4. Thus, where unions are strong locally they prefer local
regulation, while those firms that are strong nationally prefer national regulation. Yet, when it is the firms that dominate locally, the opposite is true.
What are the implications of these findings? It seems that locally weak interest groups, regardless of their attitude towards regulation as such, seek national regulation to overcome their local lack of strength. Locally dominant
groups, do not want their influence diluted on the national level. Hence, one
sees that preferences are result-oriented, with groups switching their positions
according to the regulatory results that they can expect locally or nationally.
Their preference for regulatory level is pragmatic and outcome-oriented, not
ideological or absolute.
V. SUMMARY
Proponents of deregulation usually assume that their actions lessen the interference of government with business and that they also reduce the powers of
central government. Yet, as has been discussed, neither of these expectations
may be fulfilled, because of the way in which state and local regulation may
offset federal deregulation. The setting of the strictness of regulation is a
dynamic process in which interest groups seek the most advantageous outcome. They favour the governmental level whose expected regulatory strictness conforms most closely to their interest, and this hypothesis has been confirmed by the empirical investigation of this article. Deregulation may thus
lead to the emergence of state laws that are more onerous to business than the
previous federal rules, or, alternatively, may result in the strengthening of
federal powers over states. Instead of the states gaining more regulatory
powers, they may become subject to federal restrictions of those powers.
Deregulation of private business can thus lead to an increased regulation of
another form: that of the federal government against other governments. One
may therefore have to choose between deregulation and decentralization,
rather than achieving both, and advocates of deregulation must consider this
trade-off.
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CATCH-Appendix 1
Reaction Functions of State Regulations
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APPENDIX 3
DETERMINANTS OF THE PROBABILITY
FOR NATIONAL CODE ADOPTION

POP

-.00025
(1.9261)
-. 00024
(.5377)
.0038
(.4926)
.00012
(1 .5219)
.0261
(1.3217)
.2629
(.1291)
.1412
(.4896)
-.0026
(.8661)
-.0041
(3.9487)
.0803
(.2295)
-. 3499
(2.26411)

BUILDPERM
EMP
LAND
CONSERV
REG 1 (South)
REG 2 (West)
TOWN
CODEAGE
CITYMAN
PN-

SUNION
SFIRM

.3126
t - statistics in parenthesis
APPENDIX 4
DETERMINANTS OF THE PROBABILITY
FOR NATIONAL CODE ADOPTION
Co-efficients of
Union and Firm Preference for National Regulation

Localities with
Union Predominance

Localities with
Firm Predominance

SUNION

-. 3338
(3.1519)

.0715
(1.7271)

SFIRM

3.0852
(3.1566)

-. 1789
(1.9316)

